Fraud in Rights and Contracts: a Review of Bankruptcy Case of Livent Inc. Based on Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC) Framework by Widhoyoko, S. A. (Samuel)
Copyright©2017
P-ISSN: 2087-1228
E-ISSN: 2476-9053
31
Binus Business Review, 8(1), May 2017, 31-39
DOI: 10.21512/bbr.v8i1.1827
Fraud in Rights and Contracts: 
A Review of Bankruptcy Case of Livent Inc. 
Based on Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC) 
Framework 
Samuel Anindyo Widhoyoko
Accounting Department, Faculty of Social Science, Podomoro University
Jln. Letjen. S. Parman No.28, Jakarta Barat 11470, Indonesia
samuel.anindyo@podomorouniversity.ac.id
Received: 8th November 2016/ Revised: 23rd January 2017/ Accepted: 6th March 2017 
How to Cite: Widhoyoko, S. A. (2017). Fraud in Rights and Contracts: A Review 
of Bankruptcy Case of Livent Inc. Based on Governance, Risk, and Compliance 
(GRC) Framework . Binus Business Review, 8(1), 31-39. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.21512/bbr.v8i1.1827
ABSTRACT
This research discussed the accounting scandal in the perspective of governance, risk, and compliance using 
Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC) framework. The purpose of the research was to highlight early 
business fraud that usually initiated by the company in boosting up the revenue during the Initial public offering 
(IPO) processes. This research focused on a case showing how a business could make the wrong statement to  the 
investors through real and lawful future contracts with unqualified audit opinion. Structurally, this research was 
done through the action research method in pointing out all the directors’ failures in their function to hold the 
fiduciary duty to exercise their responsibility. Based on the analysis, it is highlighted that directors in the aspect of 
(1) governance decisive, they fail to set proportional target, provide ethical value, and react positively to maintain 
the company sustainability; (2) compliance submissive, they do not submit the accounting standards through 
undisclosed third-party agreement, misrepresentation of revenue recognition, and mistreatment of expense 
omission; (3) risk preventive, they fail to assess the risk occurs from legal aspect of conflict of interest, long-term 
contractual and engagement risks, and insufficient future cash flow.  
Keywords: fraud, rights, contracts, bankruptcy, GRC, earnings management, corporate governance, accounting 
standard
INTRODUCTION
Earning management is managers’ judgment in 
financial reporting and structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to mislead some stakeholders about 
the underlying economic performance of a company 
or influence the contractual outcomes that heavily 
depend on reported accounting number (Nurlis, 2016). 
Good governance practices have always been sounded 
like  a slogan to maintain the corporate sustainability. 
However, directors’ ethical value in facing the facts that 
there are always conflicts between the stakeholders’ 
interest would affect the accountability of reporting. 
In this element, good directors are expected to show 
the proper tone of the top as well as to exercise their 
duties in good faith including applying the value of 
transparency and accountability (Tsay, 2010).   
Based on the bankruptcy case of Livent Inc., 
Drabinsky and Gottlieb intentionally manipulated 
the company financial statement in three periods 
which were 1991-1992 in the first fiscal year of 
company operation. In 1994-1996, they became the 
public company and attempted to  meet the Wallstreet 
projection. Then, in 1996-1997, they improperly 
capitalized arm-length. The worst part was when the 
external auditor who was obliged to be independent, 
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did not act professionally and lawfully in the audit 
opinion due to the conflict of interests between parties. 
The external auditor was charged by the court $85 
million dollars for this negligence.
Good governance concept is a mechanism 
to enhance the efficiency without setting the ethical 
value aside. A framework named Governance, Risk, 
and Compliance (GRC) is applicable in this situation 
(Papazafeiropoulou & Spanaki, 2015). Corporate 
sustainability is reflected from its transparency 
that affects the society through good governance, 
compliance system, and adequate risk assessment 
program (Popoola, Ahmad, & Samsudin, 2014). 
Based on these arguments, it can be said that corporate 
stability and transparency depend on how success it is 
in the aspect of governance, risk, and compliance. 
GRC is an adaptable model in analyzing 
the implementation of compliance processes for 
an employee to the company policies and in the 
wider range topic such as a company to corporation 
acts (Papazafeiropoulou & Spanaki, 2015). The 
expansion of GRC model also comprises the scope 
of reorganizing risk management practices in the 
energy industry. In this context, GRC model is used 
to view the performance of economic main key 
players in an environment  like directors, auditors, or 
politicians (Bedard & Johnstone, 2004). Hence, GRC 
model is capable  of measur ing the performance of 
risk assessment as well as  the compliance process 
both the management personnel. Figure 1 shows the 
components of GRC.
Figure 1 The Components of GRC Framework
(Source: Bedard & Johnstone, 2004)
Fraud Triangle  by Kassem and Higson (2012) 
and Fraud  Diamond  by Wolfe and Hermanson (2003) 
play an important role in prevention and detection 
that focus on the human ethical behavior, decisions of 
top management level, and the ability to override the 
system. Both frameworks focus on the psychological 
factors affecting someone to perpetrate the policies like 
financial and personal pressure, exposed opportunity, 
and rationalization ability. Then, the fraud diamond 
develops the element of capability which designates 
board of directors, managers, internal auditors, 
industry specialists and expertise who can infiltrate the 
internal control without being compromised  (Wolfe & 
Hermanson, 2003).
In analyzing information system, the elements 
in integrated Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO) framework 
are always used to assess the sustainability of 
corporate operations including the risk of fraud and 
misstatement. There are numerous developments of 
COSO framework such as Occupational Framework 
of Detection using Social Network Analysis (OFD-
SNA); Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA) 
which contains three-layer of controls, namely 
administrative, operational, and technical; and 
Diagnose-Detect-Respond framework of information 
system audit. These frameworks have detection 
and nature in risk examination. Another governance 
framework is Money-Ideology-Coercion-Ego (MICE). 
It is one of the fraud motivation frameworks. This 
framework contains a political and ideology nature 
which contradicts the content of the case. Finally, 
international accounting standards and accounting 
standards codification are the criterion in reporting 
fairness in the company.
Compared to the frameworks mentioned, GRC 
framework encompasses broader view to the company 
operations. First, governance decisive focuses on the 
analysis of executed corporate plans and policies by 
the board of directors influenced by psychological 
triggers and ethical values. Second, compliance 
submissive exposes and assesses the fairness of 
business activities, practices, and reporting. Third, risk 
preventive analyzes the effects and outcomes that may 
occur company transactional activities including joint 
venture, merger and acquisition, project cooperation, 
and third-party contracts and agreements. Based 
on the general scope by applying this framework 
to bankruptcy analysis of Livent Inc., it is clearly 
possible in pointing out the manipulation scheme of the 
company in the early IPO stage using the mistreatment 
of financial figures and interpretations.
The question of this research is regarding 
the fraud occurred from future contracts and rights 
situation faced by the Livent Inc., which function that 
does not run proportionally between all factors of good 
governance such as governance decisive, compliance 
submissive, and risk compliance. Hence, the findings 
are expected to assist the potential and actual stock 
investors in understanding one of the schemes of a 
company in the field of earnings manipulation. This is 
because when the company has no sufficient income 
from operational activities, the future contracts, 
agreement, and project are vulnerable to be used as 
earning manipulation schemes.
METHODS
The method used in this research is a literature 
review. It is based on the journal article related to 
occupation, business, and good corporate governance 
framework and international accounting standards. 
This research is also structured in accordance with the 
case proceeding held in the district court.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The result of this research is divided into three 
parts. The first part is governance decisive. The main 
subject in the corporate performance examination is 
the decisions initiated by the board of directors in the 
company as environmental controllers. Committee of 
Sponsoring Organization of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) explains that control environment is as 
important as a foundation of a building. It creates the 
proper tone of the top in which all subordinates must 
follow. Proper tone comprises all aspects including 
integrity, responsibility and, accountability (Hayne & 
Free, 2014). Beyond these values, decisions and target 
settings also affect the management stability due to the 
pressure of unrealistic targets. This part emphasizes in 
how directors of Livent Inc. assign the earning target 
resulting in fraudulent financial reporting. 
In Initial Public Offering (IPO), the potential 
earnings that exist in the market from potential 
stock investors have tempted the board of directors 
to create a financial look disregarding the fairness 
and accountability of the financial reporting. This is 
supported by the directors’ rationalization and over-
confidence in the company ability to pay-off all hidden 
losses as time goes by through cash from investors’ 
stock investment and long-term bank loans (Brennan 
& Solomon, 2008). A fraud that is likely to happen 
in IPO stages in the company is assets and income 
overstatement. Moreover, if it is possible, it can be 
compounded by the intentional fraudulent deletion, 
displacement of expense, and related party transaction 
(Ariff & Hashim, 2014). 
One of the main reasons of managers to violate 
the policies made by the board of di rectors is the 
unsuccessful target set by directors (Hematfar & 
Tajgardan, 2013) which can be categorized as both 
pressure and rationalization in fraud triangle (Kassem & 
Higson, 2012). The other reason behind this fraudulent 
behavior is the chief executive compensation for the 
target achieved by the directors (Butala & Khan, 2010; 
Hansen & Trego, 2015). Based on these reasons, the 
transparency between investors, auditors, and directors 
are highly demanded to enhance macroeconomic 
stability. Research shows that  occupational fraud and 
abuse in the context of stock market trading are done 
through the violation of accounting standards, failure 
o f assurance service providers, and  the lack control 
of governance system. The research finds that 75% of 
the methods used is revenue overstatement (Asgari, 
Salehi, & Mohammadi, 2014).  
According to Ardakani (2013), most of the 
fraudulent reporting has been exercised even before the 
companies apply IPO in order to attract new investors. 
False misrepresentation of sales recognition that ends 
with earning overstatement is the common type used 
in fraudulent reporting (Liapis & Galanos, 2010). 
Meanwhile, undisclosed related party transactions are 
always used together with the revenue overstatement 
due to the falsehood accounts to the investor to show 
that the companies  have potential earnings from long-
term project contracts with other businesses (Burton, 
2013). 
Furthermore, consistent with the notion that the 
mere presence of related party transactions does not 
necessarily elevate the risk of fraud, it indicates that 
external auditors do not view the presence of related 
party transactions as the most significant indicators 
of potential fraud as described by Fafatas (2010). 
Applying these theoretical explanations to Livent Inc. 
bankruptcy case, there are three points regarding the 
governance failure. First, as a decision maker, the 
directors fail to set proportional earnings target by 
the company. Second, as a proper tone at the top, the 
directors show improper values as they manage and 
direct employees in conducting a creative accounting.
Third, as a caretaker of fiduciary duty, the directors 
cannot prevent the effects of income smoothing 
practices harming the viability of the investors and 
company.   
The second part is about compliance submissive. 
Companies indulge in income smoothing practices 
because investors are willing to pay for stocks with 
steady and predictable earnings streams, compared 
with stocks whose earnings are subject to wild 
fluctuations (Elouafa, 2012). There are three main 
General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
which are allegedly violated by Livent Inc. chief 
officers. Those are (1) undisclosed side agreements of 
the  related-party transaction; (2) misrepresentation of 
revenue recognition; and (3) misplacement of expense 
recognition. Table 1 shows the conflict of interest 
between the director of Livent Inc. with other third-
party enterprises. 
Table 1 Gottlieb Undisclosed Relationships 
with The Third Parties
Company Gottlieb Undisclosed Relationships
CIBC Wood 
Gundy Capital
Gottlieb asked the managing director 
of Wood Gundy who negotiated the 
transaction by not disclosing the side 
agreements.
Dundee Realty 
Corporation
Gottlieb was a director and shareholder 
of Dundee parent corporation, Dundee 
Bancorp Inc.
Dewlim Invest-
ments Ltd.
Gottlieb promised the personal share 
options of Livent Inc. to Dewlim as 
security for the $4,5 million loan.
(Source: U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York, 1998)
According to International Accounting Standard 
(IAS) 24, the related party transaction is defined as “a 
transfer of resources, services, or obligations between 
related parties regardless of whether a price is charged” 
(International Accounting Standard Boards, 2009). 
Regarding this accounting standard, Corlaciu and 
Tudor (2011) interpreted that the standard required 
disclosure of related party transactions and balances 
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in the individual financial statements of parent 
companies and subsidiaries. This means that intra-
group transactions between such entities are disclosed, 
although such disclosures are likely to be aggregated 
by type because of their large volume.   
In the second fraud scheme, Livent Inc. has 
violated the revenue recognition procedure according 
to Accounting Standard Codification (ASC) 605. It 
states that the least requirement fulfilled by an entity 
to recognize revenue from a contract is the fulfillment 
of performance obligation (Financial Accounting 
Standard Boards, 2014). The main requirements for 
obligation fulfillment are when the assets receiver 
possesses the assets (rights) from the seller including 
the legal title and the right to use the rights given 
by the company, and there is a promissory note 
regarding the procurement of the items or services 
ordered (Burton, 2013).
Feroz, Park, and Pastena (1991) found that the 
value of a company stock price did not depend solely 
on the company operational due to its dependency of 
future agreements. It depended on projection regarding 
the income and proposed long-term investors. These 
results triggered FASB’s current deliberations on 
revenue recognition. Furthermore, most companies 
in America stood firmly at recession through the 
earnings management. One of them is by shifting 
previous revenue and contract to the current period 
(Magdalena & Dananjaya, 2015). However, these acts 
forsake operating cash flow. This causes the inability 
of dividend distribution  and the freefall of  share price 
(Asgari et al., 2014). 
Moreover, there are two improper revenue 
recognition methods done by the company. The first 
scheme used is by recognizing revenue from future 
contracts without considering the refund clauses the 
side agreements requires Livent Inc. to return all funds 
plus interests which look favorable to third parties 
but is vulnerable to the first party. These agreements 
are created by directors of Livent Inc. to gain $13,6 
million revenue (Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 
2013) by giving up the cash.
Figure 2 depicts the schemes between Livent 
Inc. and other parties. The black line is the type of 
contracts stated on the company annual reporting as 
future revenue as a factor that boosts the share price in 
the market. However, the red line shows the real forms 
of the contractual rights. It states that Livent Inc. should 
pay back all the costs with additional clauses when 
Livent Inc. fails to provide any output (shows). In 
Figure 2 First Revenue Recognition Scheme of Livent Inc. 
(Source: U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2016)
Figure 3 Revenue Recognition Scheme of Livent Inc.
(Source: U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2016)
35Fraud in Rights and Contracts:.....(Samuel Anindyo Widhoyoko)
fact, there are many shows that are not provided by the 
company. It prohibits Livent Inc. to record a revenue 
due to the unfulfillment of performance obligation 
(U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, 1998).
Based on Figure 3, the scheme of Livent Inc. is 
acquiring the project from Toronto and intentionally 
selling the rest project to Dundee solely by converting 
a project to the saleable right when the formal 
agreement states non-refundable. In this case, since 
the decision maker of third parties is Gottlieb. “Put 
agreement” is easily agreed by both companies as the 
effect of conflict of interest. This agreement allows 
Dundee to secede from the project and cause the joint 
venture. Therefore, Livent Inc. is obliged to repay 
Dundee investment and indirectly provides the reason 
for Livent Inc. to get $7,4 million revenue from the 
project sold when they have to forsake cash (U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
2016). 
Then, The third creative accounting done by 
Livent Inc. is misplacements of expense recognition 
and expense deletion. The earnings manipulation is to 
increase both the earnings margin and company net 
worth (Mostafa & Dixon, 2013). The first violation 
is the matter of the pre-production cost. ASC 340 
regulates that the determination of costs that should 
be expensed or capitalized is a separate analysis from 
those activities by transferr ing a good or service to 
the customer (Financial Accounting Standard Boards, 
2012). For example, when an entity acquires a future 
project, it requires some costs to start, then it must 
be capitalized as assets (deferred cost) and amortized 
based on the policies (timeline limit). According to the 
legal proceeding conducted in Ontario as described 
by Singleton-Green (2016), a statement spoken of the 
witnesses who have worked in the finance department 
of Livent Inc. stating that the accounting policies for 
the preproduction cost account have been structured in 
accordance with GAAP to ensure that all preproduction 
costs are amortized for 5 years.          
Next, value degradation of fixed assets must be 
recognized as depreciation or amortization expenses. 
In this matter, Livent Inc. violates the standards by 
improperly capitalizing amortization and depreciation 
expense. The purpose of this act is to: (1) improperly 
show the investors regarding the favorable availability 
of fixed assets; (2) postpone the expense recording; 
and (3) distribute the amount of assets impairment in 
a smaller amount (Fafatas, 2010). Biondi and Lapsley 
(2014) discussed that in the amortization treatment, 
many companies extended the amortization period 
or classified some of the assets to fixed assets and 
long-term investments which had longer useful life. 
This results to an appealing financial reporting with 
convincing liquidity and persuasive EPS (Biondi & 
Lapsley, 2014; Gupta & Gupta, 2015). Based on this 
fact, the directors of Livent Inc. have at least one 
rationalization to lengthen the amortization period 
falsely through expenses capitalization. Figure 4 
illustrates the liabilities and expense omissions scheme 
of Livent Inc. 
Then, Livent Inc. seldom erases expenses 
roughly during the period through the ignorance of 
matching principle. According to Crosby, Devaney, 
and Law (2011) amongst 100 companies, the 
advertising expense had a positive effect on the 
growth of stock price. This research also identified that 
2,76% of the increase in advertising expense would 
affect 5 to 8,7% of sales growth. Hence, the adverse 
comparison between the revenue growth and expense 
proportion is one of the red flags for financial crime 
caused by company mischaracterization of transaction 
identification and rough data concealment (Baz, 
Samsudin, Che-ahmad, & Johnson, 2016; Magdalena 
& Dananjaya, 2015).  
In addition, the current ratio (0,45:1) can mean 
that Livent Inc. has a lack of cash (only $10 million) 
due to revenues admission from future contracts. This 
scheme is easy to be predic ted based on the fact that 
Livent Inc., in its cash crisis would attempt to ensure 
the investors regarding the viability of a company by 
relying on long-term assets and contracts revenues. 
This type of scheme utilizes the figure provided in 
cash flow from investing activities rather than cash 
flow from operating activities (Mostafa & Dixon, 
2013) due to the lack of real cash from the real sales 
transactions to ensure the investors about the company 
long-term assets (Muse et al., 2016).  
Figure 4 Liabilities and Expense Omissions Scheme of Livent Inc.
(Source: U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2016)
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The other problem occurred in this scheme is 
a peculiar documentation such as time difference 
between the date written on the invoice and the date 
posted, the difference in some dollars between the 
invoice and the journal entries, and many invoices 
appeared to be unrecorded (Repousis, 2013). The most 
confusing issue of the scheme is when the company 
has no cash to report due to the inability to pay general 
expenses. When expenses have been piled up without 
the availability of cash, the company will shift the 
expense to liability (Muse et al., 2016). Accordingly, it 
is perceptible that Livent Inc. has a mounting liabilities 
and increasing payable interest over the accounting 
period. Furthermore, the concealment of each booming 
liabilities is concealed in other liabilities section on 
the balance sheet to prevent Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
reduction.
Last, the third part of the result is risk preventive. 
As a caretaker of fiduciary duty, the directors fail 
to prevent the harmful effects of income smoothing 
practice. Livent Inc. directors are the parties who have 
this responsibility to assess the risk regarding the 
company acts. There are two directors’ failures in risk 
prevention. They fail to assess the risk occurs from: (1) 
the legal aspect of conflict of interest; (2) the long-term 
contract and engagement risks; and (3) the insufficient 
future cash flow. A slight risk occurred from the 
transactions especially third party transactions must 
be clearly measured. Failing to exercise this fiduciary 
duty means a civil contravention for the directors 
(Black, 2001). However, if the acts are intended to 
defraud any parties, the directors are sentenced by 
criminal sanctions (Burton, 2013).
Furthermore, earning management practices 
have been the solution for company operational 
growth. Such practices include all techniques related 
to revenue-boosting and expense downgradings 
like income smoothing and tax avoidance (Perols & 
Lougee, 2011). There is a slight distinction between 
earning management and manipulation which is a 
legal aspect. Earnings manipulation cases are usually 
begun with the conflict of interest scheme between (1) 
the board of directors and the third-party company; 
and (2) the board of directors with the external auditor. 
The conflict of interest between companies brings 
out a risk in which one of the companies may face 
an unfavorable agreement which endangers the other 
stakeholders (investors and employees) as the first risk 
preventive failure. Meanwhile, more severe risk may 
occur when the company engages unlawfully with 
external auditors like bankruptcy.
Sonnier, Lassar, and Greene (2016) explained 
that there  were two methods for measuring whether 
the perpetrator had an intention to defraud the company 
reporting or not. First, through information obtained 
from a whistleblower who report ed the company 
corporate governance such as the board of directors, 
or the internal auditor who was under-pressured by 
the boards. On the other hand, an intention could also 
be easily derived from the understanding of board of 
directors regarding defrauding transactions with the 
assistance by the internal auditors’ illegal assistance.
The other method is through the investigation related 
to internal auditors and chief financial officers 
involvement (U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, 1998).
In this case, directors of Livent Inc. have 
engaged in both schemes causing the overstated assets 
and income with an unqualified audit opinion from 
Deloitte and Touche. The scheme is blown up when the 
company could not  present sufficient proof regarding 
all capitalization activities (assets) and operational 
output (revenues). According to fraud diamond 
theory, a perpetrator would rationalize the fraudulent 
behavior by assuming that the presentation of the 
report adequately complies with the standards with no 
regards to the long-term effect caused by the absence 
of additional information (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2003). 
These long-term effects are not legally sufficient and 
are not calculated carefully by both directors.
Moreover, the second risk preventive failure is 
the risk emerged from the third-party contracts and 
agreement with third parties. Dechow, Ge, Larson, and 
Sloan (2011) explained how irregularities such as off-
balance sheet items were vulnerable to be untaken as 
one of the risks consideration. It is based on the facts 
showing that companies which defrauded investors 
through promising contracts although the auditors 
have no track to the documents. To defraud investors, 
there are three ways: (1) engaging with double-signed 
contracts; (2) engaging with unfavorable contracts to 
attract third parties; and (3) engaging undisclosed sell-
back contracts. The purpose of these schemes is to 
deceive the investors with potential long-term projects 
while piling up the invested cash in other instruments.
Economically, future contracts can be assumed 
as both company earnings from the project and 
potential risks for fraudulent representations of 
revenue recognition (Burton, 2013). It is prohibited to 
assume revenue based on the project transfer without 
an agreement that certain completions are done unless 
it is an unemployed project (Brennan & Solomon, 
2008). The revenue recognition deals with the earnings 
from operational. An idle project can be recognized as 
Bogus revenue (Liapis & Galanos, 2010).
It is found in the Livent Inc. cases that there are 
two types of deceitful confidential agreement used. 
Firstly, an agreement made to ensure the benefits for 
the third parties such as interest, gain, cash-back, and 
other additional services. Secondly, an agreement 
is made to permit the third parties to terminate the 
pr oject at any time provided that they must record 
it as assets. Both agreements infringe the accounting 
principles due to the uncertainty of cash possession, 
and the unreal depiction of financial position for 
investors (Dechow, Ge, Larson, & Sloan, 2011). Table 
2 is the formal and side agreements of Livent Inc. with 
third parties.
Based on Table 2, it shows that the directors 
wishes to create a promising image for the company 
superficially at the expense of operational. On the 
other hand, investors are also required to be aware 
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of such schemes. Most investors have been suffering 
during the Wall Street crash due to temptation in the 
promising stock price of the company which places 
unearned revenue and deferred cost as the financial 
components (Hansen & Trego, 2015).
Table 2 The Formal and Side Agreements of Livent Inc.  
with Related Third-Parties
Company Formal Agreement Side Agreement
Pace Theatrical 
Group
The fee was made 
nonrefundable, 
regardless of whether 
Livent made shows 
available to Pace or 
not.
•15 of June 1996
•8 of August 1997
Pace had the right to 
recoup its fees, plus earned 
additional profit, as the shows 
were performed through 
reimbursement for each show 
and entitled to the limited 
percentage of adjusted gross 
ticket sales as profit sharing.  
•17 of June 1996
•20 of August 1997
American Artists The fee was made 
nonrefundable, 
regardless of 
whether Livent made 
“Ragtime” available 
to American artists 
or not.
•9 of September 1997
American Artists might recoup 
its fees in two ways:
-Through fixed weekly 
amounts when the shows were 
performed.
-Through consulting fees 
for the services of American 
artists’ president, Jon Platt.
•29 of September 1997
•15 of November 1997
CIBC Wood 
Gundy Capital
The fee from 
Wood Gundy was 
nonrefundable, and 
Livent Inc. had no 
obligation to stage the 
plays or to exercise 
its repurchase option.
•23 of December 
1997
Wood Gundy might recoup its 
fees in two ways:
-If Livent Inc. had conducted 
the repurchase option, Livent 
Inc. would have repaid all 
fees, plus 112,500 British 
pounds, plus royalties.
-If Livent Inc. had not done 
the repurchase option, 
Livent Inc. would have paid 
Wood Gundy an additional 
royalty 10% of the adjusted 
gross weekly ticket sales of 
the Broadway production 
of “Ragtime,” which was 
expected to run for years and 
generate a weekly royalty of 
approximately U.S. $90,000.
•23 of December 1997
Dundee Realty 
Corporation
Livent Inc. and 
Dundee created 
a joint venture 
company, and Livent 
Inc. sold to Dundee 
the excess density 
rights over the land 
for $7.4 million.
•30 of June 1997
Dundee withdrew from the 
project and caused the joint 
venture. Therefore, Livent Inc 
repaid Dundee investment.
•15 of August 1997
Dewlim 
Investments 
Limited
As with the other 
sales rights, the sale 
agreement made the 
fee non-refundable.
•21 October 1996
Livent Inc. might terminate 
the project and joint venture. 
It would also repay the 
Dewlim advanced fee for the 
production rights, plus 10% 
interest.
•3 November 1997
(Source: U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York, 2016)
This situation is occurred due to the market 
demand of the inflating share prices of the company. 
Livent Inc. investors are only shown the formal 
agreement without any consideration from the 
document of side agreements. The risks that are not 
prevented are: (1) many investors invest cash heavily 
to the business; (2) the company which fails to run the 
projects based on contracts, uses the cash invested to 
pay the penalty (look at the clauses of side agreement); 
(3) the company is neither successfully run the 
operational nor heavily lack of cash; and (4) finally, 
based on the altered financial reporting (unqualified 
audit opinion), the investors demand dividends 
and repayment of the debts which is not fulfilled 
sufficiently by the company.
Finally, all types of financial statement frauds 
including revenue and asset overstatements, and 
expense and debt omissions are to be proven sooner 
or later through the availability of cash. As it has been 
explained in the second risk preventive failure, both 
realization and cancellation of the project require costs 
based on each contract. This situation is compounded 
by hampered projects. It means for the entire period, 
Livent Inc. must pay both the operational expenses 
and the penalty for the undone projects, and report 
the operational income. Hence, the only scheme that 
could cover the loss occurred is only by overstating 
income and assets amount on the income statement 
through: (1) Bogus sales (from the sale of project, not 
the ticket) and (2) Bogus assets capitalization (illegally 
forcing amortization and depreciation to deferred cost 
– expense roll).
Based on these scenarios, it is concluded that all 
schemes are done preferably for income manipulation 
rather than income smoothing. Shareholders and 
creditors have always been the triggers for financial 
statement manipulations. Due to the heavy cash 
invested, fears emerged to the directors from losses or 
earnings declines, which would affect the companies 
credit ratings and their cost of capital simply due to 
an unfavorable signal from the operation (Rusmin, 
Scully, & Tower, 2013). Both directors of Livent Inc. 
and other companies directors always have a strong 
incentive to avoid losses during the period and have 
a stronger incentive to increase earnings gradually 
(Yang & Tan, 2012). Therefore, the risk of future 
cash flow insufficiency should have been managed 
carefully by directors through the manageable volume 
of cash investment by investors. 
CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, all corporate governance based 
on GRC framework functions in Livent Inc. during 
its bankruptcy period are not running proportionally. 
In terms of governance decisive, the directors do 
not exercise their duties in good faith by placing the 
company in unfavorable agreement, and setting up 
an unrealistic target to secure short-term income. 
It is also compounded by the low ethical value of 
directors. Meanwhile, in the aspect of compliance 
with standards, it is shown that all financial reportings 
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are clearly misrepresented. However, agreements 
are not disclosed clearly in the notes to financial 
statement. Finally, the breakdown of risk prevention 
function  is not able to prevent the bankruptcy due to 
the legal risk of conflict of interest and financial risk 
of the unfavorable and undisclosed agreements. As it 
has happened to other bankruptcy cases, the company 
has a problem with future cash flow from operating 
activities.
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